Representing Autoepistemic Logic in Modal Logic by Brown, Frank
International Journal "Information Theories & Applications" Vol.10 
 
455
REPRESENTING AUTOEPISTEMIC LOGIC IN MODAL LOGIC 
Frank M. Brown 
Abstract: The nonmonotonic logic called Autoepistemic Logic is shown to be representable in a monotonic 
Modal Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are stronger than S5.  Specifically, it is proven that a set of 
sentences of First Order Logic is a fixed-point of the fixed-point equation of Autoepistemic Logic with an initial 
set of axioms if and only if the meaning or rather disquotation of that set of sentences is logically equivalent to 
a particular modal functor of the meaning of that initial set of sentences.  This result is important because the 
modal representation allows the use of powerful automatic deduction systems for Modal Logic and unlike the 
original Autoepistemic Logic, it is easily generalized to the case where quantified variables may be shared 
across the scope of modal expressions thus allowing the derivation of quantified consequences.  Furthermore, 
this generalization properly treats such quantifiers since both the Barcan formula and its converse hold 
Keywords: Autoepistemic Logic, Modal Logic, Nonmonotonic Logic. 
1. Introduction 
One of the most well known nonmonotonic logics [Antoniou 1997] which inherently deals with entailment 
conditions in addition to possibility conditions in its sentences is the so-called Autoepistemic Logic [Moore 
1985]10.  The basic idea of Autoepistemic Logic is that there is a set of axioms {'Γi} and for every closed 
sentence χ there are two non-logical "inference rules" of the forms: 
 χ:                                     :¬χ 
L'χ                                   ¬L'χ 
where the predicate symbol L intuitively means that its argument names a sentence which is inferable.  The 
first rule suggests that L 'χ may be inferred from χ and the second rule suggests that ¬L'χ may be inferred if 
χ is not inferable.  When L is in Γ such "inference rules" maybe circular in that determining if they are 
applicable depends on the inferability or noninferability of χ which in turn depends on what else was derivable.  
Thus, tentatively applying such inference rules by checking whether χ has been or has not yet been inferred 
produces consequences which may later have to be retracted.  For this reason valid inferences in a 
nonmonotonic logic such as Autoepistemic Logic are essentially carried out not in the original nonmonotonic 
language, but rather in some (monotonic) metatheory in which that nonmonotonic logic is defined.  [Moore 
1985; Konolige 1987; Konolige 1987b] explicated the above intuition by defining Autoepistemic Logic in terms 
of the set theoretic proof theory metalanguage of a First Order Logic (i.e. FOL) object language with the fixed-
point equation: 
'κ=(ael 'κ {'Γi}}) 
where ael is defined as: 
            (ael 'κ {'Γi})=df(fol({'Γi}∪{'(L 'χi):'χiε'κ}∪{'(¬(L 'χi)):'χi∉'κ})) 
where 'χi is the ith sentence of the FOL object language and where 'κ and {'Γi} are sets of closed sentences 
of the FOL object language.  A closed sentence is a sentence without any free variables.  fol is a function 
which produces the set of theorems derivable in FOL from the set of sentences to which it is applied.  The 
quotations appended to the front of these Greek letters indicate references in the metalanguage to the 
sentences of the FOL object language.  Interpreted doxastically this fixed-point equation states: 
 
 
the set of closed sentences which are believed is equal to 
  the set of theorems derivable by the laws of FOL from the union of  
         the set of closed sentences {'Γi}, 
         the set of all closed sentences of the form:  '(L 'χi) for each i such that 'χi is believed, 
         and the set of all closed sentences of the form:  '(¬(L 'χi)) for each i such that 'χi is not believed. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that all this metatheoretic machinery including the formalized syntax of 
FOL, the proof theory of FOL, the axioms of a strong set theory, and the set theoretic fixed-point equation is 
                                                          
10Autoepistemic Logic may be viewed as an improved version of the systems described in [McDermott 1980; McDermott 1982]. 
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not needed and that the essence of Autoepistemic Logic is representable as a necessary equivalence in a 
(monotonic) Modal Quantificational Logic.  Interpreted as a doxastic logic this equivalence states: 
that which is believed is equivalent to:    for all i Γi and for all i (L 'χi) if and only if χi is believed. 
thereby eliminating the metatheoretic machinery.11 
 
The remainder of this paper proves that this modal representation is equivalent to Autoepistemic Logic.  
Section 2 describes a formalized syntax for a FOL object language.  Section 3 describes the part of the proof 
theory of FOL needed herein (i.e. theorems FOL1-FOL4).  Section 4 describes the Intensional Semantics of 
FOL which includes laws giving the meaning of FOL sentences: M0-M8, theorems giving the meaning of sets 
of sentences: MS1, MS2, MS3, and laws specifying the relationship of meaning and modality to the proof 
theory of FOL (i.e. the laws R0, A1, A2, and A3 and the theorems: C1, C2, C3, and C4).  The modal version of 
Autoepistemic Logic is defined in section 5 and explicated with theorems MA1-MA6 and SS1-SS2.  In section 
6, this modal version is shown by theorems AEL1 and AEL2 to be equivalent to the set theoretic fixed-point 
equation for Autoepistemic Logic.  Figure 1 outlines the relationship of all these theorems in producing the 




















Figure 1: Dependencies among the Theorems 
 
2. Formal Syntax of First Order Logic 
We use a First Order Logic (i.e. FOL) defined as the six tuple: (→, #f, ∀, vars, predicates, functions) where 
→, #f, and ∀ are logical symbols, vars is a set of variable symbols, predicates is a set of predicate symbols 
each of which has an implicit arity specifying the number of associated terms, and functions is a set of 
function symbols each of which has an implicit arity specifying the number of associated terms.  The sets of 
logical symbols, variables, predicate symbols, and function symbols are pairwise disjoint.  Lower case Roman 
letters possibly  indexed with digits are used as variables.  Greek letters possibly indexed with digits are used 
as syntactic metavariables. γ, γ1,...,γn, range over the variables, ξ, ξ1,...,ξn range over sequences of 
variables of an appropriate arity, π,π1...πn range over the predicate symbols, φ, φ1...φn range over function 
symbols, δ, δ1...δn, σ  range over terms, and α, α1,...,αn, β, β1,...,βn,χ, χ1,...,χn, Γ1,...,Γn,ϕ range over 
sentences.  The terms are of the forms γ and (φ δ1...δn), and the sentences are of the forms (α→β), #f, (∀γ 
α), and (π δ1...δn).  A nullary predicate π or function φ is written as a sentence or a term without 
parentheses.  ϕ{π/λξα} represents the replacement of all occurrences of π in ϕ by λξα followed by lambda 
conversion.  The primitive symbols are shown in Figure 2 with their intuitive interpretations. 
Symbol Meaning 
α→ β if α then β. 
#f falsity 
∀γ α for all γ, α. 
Figure 2: Primitive Symbols of First Order Logic 
 
The defined symbols are listed in Figure 3 with their definitions and intuitive interpretations. 
                                                          
11The occurrence of quotation in the argument to L may be replaced by using a new symbol L such that (L ) replaces (L 
'). 
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Symbol Definition Meaning  Symbol Definition Meaning 
¬α α → #f not α  α∧β ¬(α → ¬β) α and β 
#t ¬ #f truth  α↔ β (α→ β) ∧ (β→ α) α if and only if β 
α∨β (¬ α)→ β α or β  ∃γ α ¬∀γ ¬α for some γ , α 
Figure 3: Defined Symbols of First Order Logic 
 
The particular FOL used herein includes the predicate symbol L and a denumerably infinite number of 0-ary 
function symbols representing the names (i.e. ') of the sentences (i.e. ) of this First Order Logic.  The FOL 
object language expressions are referred in the metalanguage (which also includes a FOL syntax) by inserting 
a quote sign in front of the object language entity thereby making a structural descriptive name of that entity.   
In addition to referring to object language sentences, the formalized metalanguage also needs to refer to sets 
of sentences of FOL.  Generally, a set of sentences is represented as: {'Γi} which is defined as: {'Γi: #t} which 
in turn is defined as: {s: ∃i(s='Γi)} where i ranges over some range of numbers (which may be finite or non-
infinite).  With a slight abuse of  notation we also write 'κ, 'Γ  to refer to such sets. 
3. Proof Theory of First Order Logic 
First Order Logic (i.e. FOL) is axiomatized with a recursively enumerable set of theorems as the set of axioms 
is itself recursively enumerable and its inference rules are recursive.  The axioms and inference rules of FOL 
[Mendelson 1964] are those given in Figure 4.  They form a standard set of axioms and inference rules for 
FOL. 
 
MA1: α → (β→ α)     MR1: from α and (α→ β) infer β 
MA2: (α→ ( β→ ρ)) → ((α→ β)→ (α→ ρ))  MR2: from α infer (∀γ α) 
MA3: ((¬ α)→ (¬ β))→ (((¬ α)→ β)→α) 
MA4: (∀γ α)→ β  where β is the result of substituting an expression (which is free for the free positions 
        of γ  in α) for  all the free occurrences of γ  in α. 
MA5: ((∀γ(α → β)) →  (α→(∀γ β)))  where γ does not occur in α. 
Figure 4: Inferences Rules and Axioms of FOL 
 
In order to talk about sets of sentences we include in the metatheory set theory symbolism as developed 
along the lines of [Quine 1969].  This set theory includes the symbols ε, ∉, ⊃, =, ∪ as is defined therein. 
The derivation operation (i.e. fol) of any First Order Logic obeys the Inclusion (i.e. FOL1) and Idempotence 
(i.e. FOL2) properties:  
FOL1: (fol 'κ)⊃'κ      Inclusion 
FOL2: (fol 'κ)⊃(fol(fol 'κ))     Idempotence 
From these two properties we prove: 
FOL3:  (ael 'κ 'Γ 'αi:'βij/'χi))=(fol(ael 'κ 'Γ 'αi:'βij/'χi)) 
proof: FOL1 and FOL2 imply that (fol(fol 'κ))=(fol 'κ).  Since ael begins with fol this implies: 'κ=(fol(ael 'κ)) 
QED. 
FOL4: ('κ=(ael 'κ 'Γ 'αi:'βij/'χi))→('κ=(fol 'κ)) 
proof:  From the hypothesis and FOL3: 'κ=(fol(ael 'κ 'Γ 'αi:'βij/'χi)) is derived.  Using the hypothesis to 
replace (ael 'κ 'Γ 'αi:'βij/'χi) by 'κ in this result gives: 'κ=(fol 'κ).  QED. 
4. Intensional Semantics of FOL 
The meaning (i.e. mg) [Brown 1978, Boyer&Moore 1981] or rather disquotation of a sentence of First Order 
Logic (i.e. FOL) is defined to satisfy the laws given in Figure 5 below  mg is defined in terms of mgs which 
maps each FOL object language sentence and an association list into a meaning.  Likewise, mgn maps a FOL 
object language term and an association list into a meaning.  An association list is simply a list of pairs 
consisting of an object language variable and the meaning to which it is bound. 
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M0: (mg 'α) =df (mgs '(∀γ1...γn α)'())  where 'γ1...'γn are all the free variables in 'α 
M1: (mgs '(α → β)a) ↔ ((mgs 'α a)→(mgs 'β a)) 
M2: (mgs '#f a) ↔ #f 
M3: (mgs '(∀ γ α)a) ↔ ∀x(mgs 'α(cons(cons 'γ x)a)) 
M4: (mgs '(π δ1...δn)a) ↔ (π(mgn 'δ1 a)...(mgn 'δn a))  for each predicate symbol 'π. 
M5: (mgn '(φ  δ1...δn)a) = (φ(mgn 'δ1 a)...(mgn 'δn a))   for each function symbol 'φ. 
M6: (mgn 'γ a) = (cdr(assoc 'γ a)) 
M7: (assoc v  L) = (if(eq? v(car(car L))) (car L) (assoc v(cdr L))) 
       where: cons, car, cdr, eq?, if are axiomatized as they are axiomatized in Scheme. 
M8: (mgn ''α a) = 'α 
Figure 5: The Meaning of FOL Sentences 
The meaning of a set of sentences is defined in terms of the meanings of the sentences in the set as: 
 (ms 'κ) =df ∀s((sε'κ)→(mg s)) 
MS1: (ms{'α: Γ}) ↔ ∀ξ(Γ→α)  where ξ is the sequence of all the free variables in 'α and where Γ is any 
sentence of the intensional semantics. 
proof: (ms{'α:Γ})  Unfolding ms and the set pattern abstraction symbol gives: ∀s((sε{s: ∃ξ((s='α)∧Γ)})→(mg 
s)) 
where ξ is a sequence of the free variables in 'a.  This is equivalent to: ∀s((∃ξ((s='α)∧Γ)))→(mg s)) 
which is logically equivalent to: ∀s∀ξ (((s='κ)∧Γ)→(mg s)) which is equivalent to: ∀ξ(Γ→(mg 'α)) 
Unfolding mg using M0-M8 then gives: ∀ξ(Γ→α) QED 
The meaning of the union of two sets of FOL sentences is the conjunction of their meanings (i.e. 
MS3) and the meaning of a set is the meaning of all the sentences in the set (i.e. MS2): 
MS2: (ms{'Γi}) ↔ ∀i∀ξiΓi 
proof:  (ms{'Γi})  Unfolding the set notation gives: (ms{'Γi: #t}) 
By MS1 this is equivalent to: ∀i∀ξi(#t→Γi) which is equivalent to: ∀i∀ξi(Γi QED. 
 
MS3: (ms('κ∪'Γ)) ↔ ((ms 'κ)∧(ms 'Γ)) 
proof: Unfolding ms and union in: (ms('κ∪'Γ)) gives: ∀s((sε{s: (sε'κ)∨(sε'Γ)})→(mg s)) or rather: 
∀s(((sε'κ)∨(sε'Γ))→(mg s)) which is logically equivalent to: (∀α((sε'κ)→(mg s)))∧(∀s((sε'Γ)→(mg s))) 
Folding ms twice then gives:((ms 'κ)∧(ms 'Γ)) QED. 
 
The meaning operation may be used to develop an Intensional Semantics for a FOL object language by 
axiomatizing the modal concept of necessity so that it satisfies the theorem: 
C1:          ('αε(fol 'κ))  ↔  ([] ((ms 'κ)→(mg 'α))) 
for every sentence 'α and every set of sentences 'κ of that FOL object language.  The necessity symbol is 
represented by a box: [].  C1 states that a sentence of FOL is a FOL-theorem (i.e. fol) of a set of sentences of 
FOL if and only if the meaning of that set of sentences necessarily implies the meaning of that sentence. One 
modal logic which satisfies C1 for FOL is the Z Modal Quantificational Logic described in [Brown 1987; Brown 
1989] whose theorems are recursively enumerable and which extends the weaker possibility axioms used in 
[Lewis 1936; Bressan 1972;  Hendry & Pokriefka 1985].  We note that Z includes all the laws of S5 modal 
Logic [Hughes & Cresswell 1968] whose modal axioms and inference rules are given in Figure 6.  Therein, κ 
and Γ represent arbitrary sentences of the intentional semantics. 
R0: from α infer ([] κ)   A2:  ([](κ→ Γ)) → (([]κ)→ ([]Γ)) 
A1: ([]κ) → κ    A3: ([]κ) ∨ ([]¬[]κ) 
Figure 6: The Laws of S5 Modal Logic 
These S5 modal laws and the laws of FOL given in Figure 4 constitute an S5 Modal Quantificational Logic 
similar to [Carnap 1946; Carnap 1956], and a FOL version [Parks 1976] of [Bressan 1972] in which the 
Barcan formula: (∀γ([]κ))→([]∀γκ) and its converse hold.  The R0 inference rule implies that anything 
derivable in the metatheory is necessary.  Thus, in any logic with R0, contingent facts would never be 
International Journal "Information Theories & Applications" Vol.10 
 
459
asserted as additional axioms of the metatheory.  For example, we would not assert ([](κ↔Γ)) as an axiom 
and then try to prove ([](κ→α)).  Instead we would try to prove that ([](κ↔Γ))→([](κ→α)). 
The defined Modal symbols used herein are listed in Figure 7 with their definitions and 
interpretations. 
Symbol Definition Meaning  Symbol Definition Meaning 
<>κ ¬ [] ¬κ α is logically possible  [κ] Γ  [] (κ→Γ) β entails α 
κ≡ Γ [] (κ↔Γ) α is logically equivalent to β  <κ> Γ <> (κ∧Γ) α and β is logically possible 
Figure 7: Defined Symbols of Modal Logic 
For example, folding the definition of entailment, C1 may be rewritten more compactly as: 
C1':          ('αε(fol 'κ)) ↔  ([(ms 'κ)](mg 'α)) 
This compact notation for entailment is used hereafter. 
From the laws of the Intensional Semantics we prove that the meaning of the set of FOL 
consequences of a set of sentences is the meaning of that set of sentences (C2), the FOL consequences of a 
set of sentences contain the FOL consequences of another set if and only if the meaning of the first set entails 
the meaning of the second set (C3), and the sets of FOL consequences of two sets of sentences are equal if 
and only if the meanings of the two sets are logically equivalent (C4): 
 
C2: (ms(fol 'κ))≡(ms 'κ) 
proof: The proof divides into two cases: 
(1) [(ms 'κ)](ms(fol 'κ)))  Unfolding the second ms gives: [(ms 'κ)]∀s((sε(fol 'κ))→(mg s)) 
By the soundness part of C1 this is equivalent to:  [(ms 'κ)]∀s(([(ms 'κ)](mg s))→(mg s)) 
By the S5 laws this is equivalent to: ∀s(([(ms 'κ)](mg s))→ [(ms 'κ)](mg s))  which is a tautology. 
(2) [(ms(fol 'κ))](ms 'κ)  Unfolding ms twice gives: [∀s((sε(fol 'κ))→(mg s))]∀s((sε'κ)→(mg s)) 
which is: [∀s((sε(fol 'κ))→(mg s))]((sε'κ)→(mg s))  Backchaining on the hypothesis and then dropping it 
gives: (sε'κ)→(sε(fol 'κ)).  Folding ⊃ gives an instance of FOL1. QED. 
 
C3: (fol 'κ)⊇(fol 'Γ) ↔ ([(ms 'κ)](ms 'Γ)) 
proof: Unfolding ⊇ gives: ∀s((sε(fol 'Γ))→(sε(fol 'κ))) 
By C1 twice this is equivalent to: ∀s(([(ms 'Γ)](mg s))→([(ms 'κ)](mg s))) 
By the laws of S5 modal logic this is equivalent to: ([(ms 'κ)]∀s(([(ms 'Γ)](mg s)))→(mg s))) 
By C1 this is equivalent to: [(ms 'κ)]∀s((sε(fol 'Γ))→(mg s)).  Folding ms then gives: [(ms  'κ)](ms(fol 'Γ)) 
By C2 this is equivalent to:  [(ms  'κ)](ms 'Γ). QED. 
 
C4: ((fol 'κ)=(fol 'Γ)) ↔ ((ms 'κ)≡(ms 'Γ)) 
proof:  This is equivalent to (((fol 'κ)⊇(fol 'Γ))∧((fol 'Γ)⊇(fol 'κ))) ↔ ([(ms 'κ)](ms 'Γ))∧([(ms 'Γ)](ms 'κ)) 
which follows by using C3 twice. 
5. Autoepistemic Logic Represented in Modal Logic 
The fixed-point equation for Autoepistemic Logic may be expressed in S5 Modal Quantificational Logic by the 
necessary equivalence: 
κ≡(AEL κ Γ) 
where AEL is defined as follows: (AEL κ Γ) =df Γ∧∀i((L 'χi)↔([κ]χi)) 
where χi is the ith sentence of the FOL object language.   
 
Given below are some simple properties of AEL used to prove the equivalence of the proof theoretic and 
modal representations of Autoepistemic Logic.  The first two theorems state that AEL entails Γ and that AEL 
entails for all i, (L 'χi) if and only if χi holds in κ. 
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MA1: [(AEL κ Γ)]Γ 
proof: By R0 it suffices to prove: (AEL κ Γ)→Γ.  Unfolding AEL gives: (Γ∧∀i((L 'χi)↔([κ]χi)))→Γ which is a 
tautology. QED. 
 
MA2: [(AEL κ Γ)]∀i((L 'χi)↔([κ]χi)) 
proof: By R0 it suffices to prove: (AEL κ Γ)→∀i((L 'χi)↔([κ]χi)) 
Unfolding AEL gives: [Γ∧∀i((L 'χi)↔([κ]χi)))→∀i((L 'χi)↔([κ]χi))) which is a tautology. QED. 
 
The concept (i.e. ss) of the combined meaning of all the sentences of the FOL object language whose 
meanings are entailed by a proposition is defined as follows: (ss κ) =df ∀s(([κ](mg s))→(mg s)).  SS1 shows 
that a proposition entails the combined meaning of the FOL object language sentences that it entails.  SS2 
shows that if a proposition is necessarily equivalent to the combined meaning of all the FOL object language 
sentences that it entails, then there exists a set of FOL object language sentences whose meaning is 
necessarily equivalent to that proposition: 
SS1: [κ](ss κ) 
proof: By R0 it suffices to prove: κ→(ss κ).  Unfolding ss gives: κ→∀s(([κ](mg s))→(mg s)) 
which is equivalent to:∀s(([κ](mg s))→(κ→(mg s))) which is an instance of A1. QED. 
 
SS2: (κ≡(ss κ))→ ∃s(κ≡(ms s)) 
proof: Letting s be {s: ([κ](mg s)) gives: (κ≡(ss κ))→ (κ≡(ms{s: ([κ](mg s)))) 
Unfolding ms and lambda conversion gives: (κ≡(ss κ))↔ (κ≡∀s(([κ](mg s))→(mg s))) 
Folding ss gives a tautology. QED. 
 
Theorems MA3 and MA4 are analogous to MA1 and MA2 except that AEL is replaced by the combined 
meaning of all of the sentences entailed by AEL. 
MA3: [ss(AEL κ ∀iΓi)]∀iΓi 
proof: By R0 it suffices to prove: (ss(AEL κ ∀iΓi))→∀iΓi 
Unfolding ss gives: (∀s(([(AEL κ ∀iΓi)](mg s))→(mg s)))→∀iΓi 
which is equivalent to: (∀s(([(AEL κ ∀iΓi)](mg s))→(mg s)))→Γi 
which by the meaning laws is equivalent to: (∀s(([(AEL κ ∀iΓi)](mg s))→(mg s)))→(mg 'Γi) 
Backchaining on (mg  'Γi) with s in the hypothesis assigned to be 'Γi in the conclusion shows that it suffices to 
prove:  ([(AEL κ ∀iΓi)](mg 'Γi)) which by the meaning laws is equivalent to: ([(AEL κ ∀iΓi)]Γi) 
which by the laws of S5 Modal Logic is equivalent to: ([(AEL κ ∀iΓi)]∀iΓi) which is an instance of MA1. QED. 
 
MA4: [(ss(AEL κ Γ))]∀i((L 'χi)↔([κ]χi)) 
proof:  By R0 it suffices to prove: (ss(AEL κ Γ))→∀i((L 'χi)↔([κ]χi)) 
which is equivalent to: (ss(AEL κ Γ))→((([κ]χi)→(L 'χi))∧((¬([κ]χi))→(¬(L 'χi)))) 
Unfolding ss gives: (∀s(([(AEL κ Γ)](mg s))→(mg s)))→((([κ]χi)→(L 'χi))∧((¬([κ]χi))→(¬(L 'χi)))) 
Letting the quantified s in the hypothesis have the two instances: '(L 'χi) and '(¬(L 'χi)) and then dropping that 
hypothesis gives: 
((([(AEL κ Γ)](mg '(L 'χi)))→(mg '(L 'χi)))∧(([(AEL κ Γ)](mg '(¬(L 'χi))))→(mg '(¬(L 'χi))))) 
→((([κ]χi)→(L 'χi))∧((¬([κ]χi))→(¬(L 'χi)))) 
By the meaning laws M0-M8 this is equivalent to: 
((([(AEL κ Γ)](L 'χi))→(L 'χi))∧(([(AEL κ Γ)](¬(L 'χi)))→(¬(L 'χi))))→((([κ]χi)→(L 'χi))∧((¬([κ]χi))→(¬(L 
'χi)))) 
Using these instances of the hypothesis to backchain on (L 'χi) and (¬(L 'χi)) in the conclusion, and then 
dropping these instances gives: 
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((([κ]χi)→([(AEL κ Γ)](L 'χi)))∧((¬([κ]χi)))→([(AEL κ Γ)](¬(L 'χi)))) 
Using the laws of S5 Modal Logic then gives: ([(AEL κ Γ)]((([κ]χi)→(L 'χi))∧((¬([κ]χi))→(¬(L 'χi)))) 
which is equivalent to: [(AEL κ Γ)]((L 'χi)↔([κ]χi)) which holds by MA2. QED. 
 
Finally MA5 and MA6 show that talking about the meanings of sets of FOL sentences in the modal 
representation of Autoepistemic Logic is equivalent to talking about propositions in general. 
 
MA5: (ss(AEL κ ∀iΓi)) ↔ (AEL κ ∀iΓi) 
proof: In view of SS1, it suffices to prove: (ss(AEL κ ∀iΓi))→(AEL κ ∀iΓi) 
Unfolding the second occurrence of AEL gives: (ss(AEL κ ∀iΓi))→(∀iΓi∧∀i((L 'χi)↔([κ]χi))) 
which holds by theorems MA3 and MA4. QED. 
 
MA6: (κ≡(AEL κ ∀iΓi)))→∃s(κ≡(ms s)) 
proof: (κ≡(ss(AEL κ ∀i(mg 'Γi)))) is derived from the hypothesis and MA5.  Using the hypothesis to replace 
(AEL κ ∀i(mg 'Γi))) by κ in this result gives: (κ≡(ss κ)).  By SS2 this implies the conclusion. QED. 
6. Conclusion: Autoepistemic Logic represented in Modal Logic 
The relationship between the proof theoretic definition of Autoepistemic Logic [Moore 1985] and the modal 
representation is proven in two steps.  First theorem AEL1 shows that the meaning of the set ael is the 
proposition AEL and then theorem AEL2  shows that a set of FOL sentences  which contains its FOL 
theorems is a fixed-point of the fixed-point equation of Autoepistemic Logic with an initial set of axioms if and 
only if the meaning (or rather disquotation) of that set of sentences is logically equivalent to AEL of the 
meanings of that initial set of sentences. 
 
AEL1: (ms(ael(fol 'κ){'Γi}))≡(AEL(ms 'κ)(∀iΓi)) 
proof: By R0 it suffices to prove: (ms(ael(fol 'κ){'Γi}))↔(AEL(ms 'κ)Γ).  The left side is: ms(ael(fol 'κ){'Γi}) 
Unfolding the definition of ael gives: ms(fol({'Γi}∪{'(L 'χi): 'χiε(fol 'κ)}∪{'(¬(L 'χi)): 'χi∉(fol 'κ)})) 
By C2 this is equivalent to:  ms({'Γi}∪{'(L 'χi): 'χiε(fol 'κ)}∪{'(¬(L 'χi)): 'χi∉(fol 'κ)}) 
Using C1 twice gives: ms({'Γi}∪{'(L 'χi): ([ms 'κ]χi)}∪{'(¬(L 'χi)): ¬([ms 'κ]χi)}) 
Using MS3 twice gives: (ms{'Γi})∧(ms{'(L 'χi): ([ms 'κ]χi)})∧(ms{'(¬(L 'χi)): ¬([ms 'κ]χi)}) 
Using MS2 gives: (∀iΓi)∧(ms{'(L 'χi): ([ms 'κ]χi)})∧(ms{'(¬(L 'χi)): ¬([ms 'κ]χi)}) 
Applying MS1 twice gives: (∀iΓi)∧∀i(([ms 'κ]χi)→(L 'χi))∧∀i((¬([ms 'κ]χi))→(¬(L 'χi))) 
which is logically equivalent to: (∀iΓi)∧∀i((L 'χi)↔([ms 'κ]χi)) 
Folding the definition of AEL gives: (AEL(ms 'κ)(∀iΓi)) QED. 
 
AEL2: ((fol 'κ)=(ael(fol 'κ){'Γi}))↔((ms 'κ)≡(AEL(ms 'κ)(∀iΓi))) 
proof: (fol 'κ)=(ael(fol 'κ){'Γi}).  By FOL3 this is equivalent to: (fol 'κ)=(fol(ael(fol 'κ){'Γi})) 
By C4 this is equivalent to: (ms 'κ)≡(ms(ael(fol 'κ){'Γi})).  
By AEL1 this is equivalent to:(ms 'κ)≡(AEL(ms 'κ)(∀iΓi)) QED. 
 
Theorem AEL2 shows that the set of theorems: (fol 'κ) of a set 'κ is a fixed-point of Autoepistemic Logic if and 
only if the meaning (ms 'κ) of 'κ is a solution to the necessary equivalence.  Furthermore, by FOL4 there are 
no other fixed-points (such as a set not containing all its theorems)  and by MA6 there are no other solutions 
(such as a proposition not representable as a sentence in the First Order Logic object language).  Therefore 
the Modal representation of Autoepistemic Logic (i.e. AEL), faithfully represents the original set theoretic 
description of Autoepistemic Logic (i.e. ael).  Finally, we note that (ms 'κ) and ∀iΓi may be generalized to be 
arbitrary propositions κ and Γ giving the more general modal representation: κ≡(AEL κ Γ). 




This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant Numbers: MIP-
9526532, EIA-9818341, and EIA-9972843. 
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